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NOTES

THE "EQUAL BIGHTS" AMENDMENTPOSITIVE PANACEA OR NEGATIVE NOSTRUM?
Nature has given women so much power that the law has very
wisely given them little.

Samuel Johnson.
[TIhere is as much difference between a male and a female as
between a horse chestnut and a chestnut horse.
Representative Emmanuel Celler.
You've come a long way, baby.
Contemporary television commercial.

From McSorley's Old Ale House, a New York City bastion of
masculinity for 116 years where women have finally succeeded in
being served,1 to Rochester, where they shattered teacups in protest
of inequality,2 to Syracuse, where they dumped fifty children on city
hall,3 to dozens of other cities across the country where thousands
marched and rallied,4 women have been speaking out in protest over
unequal "plight" in the world's most prosperous, democratic and
egalitarian nation.
Awareness of the present movement for women's liberation has
jarred most Americans with an earth-shattering suddenness, yet the
current activism on the part of those proposing equality for women
has vivid historical precedents, the basic beginnings dating well back
into the cradle era of the Republic.3 Early in our history, for example,
Abigail Adams wrote to her prestigious husband, John: "In the new
Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make,
I desire you would remember the ladies. . . . Remember, all men
would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is

not paid the ladies, we are determined to ferment a rebellion....6
Though Mrs. Adams undoubtedly was writing with tongue in cheek,
the acid in her pen gave indication of a movement in its infancy.
When the descendants of those suffragists who finally won the right
to vote in 19207 held a Women's Rights Convention in Seneca Falls,
I2 Tnm, Aug. 24, 1970, at 12.
Lum, Sept. 4, 1970, at 16B.

;Id.
4id.

r For an excellent and comprehensive account of the women's rights movement
from its infancy until 1920, see E. FEXNmB, CmENmY OF STuor.E (1959).
OId. at 19, citing Adams, Familiar Letters, 149-50 (letter dated Mar. 81,
1977).
7;Te right to vote was assured by ratification of the 19th Amendment to the
United States Constitution by the 36th State, Tennessee, on August 18, 1920.
See 0. CooImGE, WoMEN'S PrGnTS 159-66 (1966).
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New York, in 1948,8 their demands for equal opportunities in jobs
and education and for an end to all legal discrimination against
females were much the same as they are today.9
When the length of women's fight for equality and the simple
reasonableness of many of their demands are considered, it is indeed
a dismaying footnote that great inequities continue to exist in these
times. These inequalities exist in employment, education, domestic
life and in many other areas. Such inequities seem to stem from the
attitudes of men, who as a group, continue to hold romantic and
patronizing ideas about women, whom they feel should have only
the stereotyped feministic qualities of instability, softness, intuition
and gentleness. Men feel superior to women both mentally and
physically and generally demand a much more regimented standard
of behavior for them than they themselves would assent to. From a
hopefully masculine standpoint it seems not unreasonable to feel that
it is because of some of these outmoded male "hang-ups" that women
are rebelling. It is truly hopeful that even the most extreme liberationists are not seeking wholesale reversals, sex-wise or otherwise,
but are merely seeking human parity and the appreciation that
accompanies it.
In 1872, Justice Bradley of the United States Supreme Court,
commenting on the status of women, said: "The paramount destiny
and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."' 0 In the 1970's the
law of the Creator may be construed differently, as is implied by the
recent House of Representative's approval of an amendment to the
United States Constitution designed to assure equal rights to women,"
The basic difference between the ideas of Justice Bradley and the
350 Congressmen' 2 who voted for the new amendment is indicative
of the undeniable change wrought in the status of American women
during the last several years. But the mere fact that a constitutional
amendment is deemed necessary shows that many women are not
8 See E. FL~x=, supra note 5, at 71-77. This convention was organized and
led by Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, two of the earlier and most
famous American fighters for women's rights. For the convention, Mrs. Stanton
drafted a "Declaration of Principles" which stated in part that, "we hold these
truths to be self evident: that all men and women are created equal ... Id.
at 75. The women demanded the right to vote, as well as rights concerning education, emloyment opportunities and the ending of all discrimination against women.
'OBradwell v. State, 88 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (concurring
opinion).
"1 H. R. J.Res. 264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CoN. REc. H7947 (daily ed.
Aug. 10, 1970) [hereinafter cited as 116 CoNG. Ec.].
12 Id.at H7984.
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satisfied with their present legal status. Although some statutes look
with special favor upon the feminine gender13 many still reflect the
4
outmoded attitude that women are inferior to the male primate.1
The purposes of this note are generally four-fold: (1) to list and
discuss a representative sample of laws which discriminate on the
basis of sex; (2) to analyze leading cases which have dealt with
laws which discriminate on the basis of sex; (3) to recognize current
trends and developments in this area; and (4) most importantly,
from this background to discern the desirability of the proposed Equal

Rights Amendment and to predict its effect upon present statutes and
case law in the event it becomes part of our Constitution.

1. Tim EQUAL IGHTS AMENDMENT
A. Scope
On August 10, 1970, the House of Representatives ended 47 years
of footdragging by approving the proposed constitutional amendment
designed to give women legal rights commensurate with those of men.' 5
The proposed amendment is as follows.
Article
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress and the several states shall have the power, within their
respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by legislation.
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislators
of three-fourths of the several states.
Section 3. 6This amendment shall take effect one year after date
of ratification.'
As provided in the United States Constitution, any proposal to
amend the Constitution must be passed by the Senate and by the
Is E.g., alimony statutes, employment maternity leave statutes. These and
other such types of statutes will be treated later in this note.
14 E.g., maximum hourly and daily work restriction statutes for females,
statutes requiring special rest periods for women and other such "protective"
legislation will be discussed herein later. See note 72, supra and accompanying text.
15 The "Equal Bights" Amendment had been introduced into the House of
Representatives every year since 1923, but had never been voted upon until
August 10, 1970. The Senate, in contrast has voted on the amendment twice,
passing it in both 1950 and 1958 only to see it die in the House. CONc. Q., Aug. 14,
1970, at 2041.
10 116 CONG. REc. H7953.
*Editor's Note-This proposed amendment has been changed since the writing
of this article. The following provision has been added:
This article shall not impair the validity of any laws of the United States
which exempts a person from compulsory military service, or any other
laws of the United States, or of any state which reasonably promotes the
health and safety of the people. 29 Cong. Q. Rep. 1562-63 [July 23, 1971]
see also Courier-Journal, June 23, 1971 3A at 2 Col. 4.
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legislature of three-fourths of the States. 17 Even though the Senate on
October 13, 1970, delayed early enactment of the House resolution by
tacking on "riders,"' 8 the problem is before the public, Congress
and the Courts as at no previous time in history.
If the proposed amendment finally becomes part of the Constitution it could radically change the lives of millions of Americans.
Both supporters and foes agree that it could affect men as well as
women. 9 The main question would seem to be: Would the changes
be for better or worse? The debate begins here.
One eminent constitutional authority, Professor Paul Freund of
the Harvard Law School, claims that the amendment would, "[transform] every provision of the law concerning women into a constitutional issue to be ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court... *-"20
This would come at a time when the overburdening of the judicial
system with cases is approaching flood level. "The range of such
potential litigation is too great to be readily foreseen," Freund declares, "but it would certainly embrace ...diverse legal provisions" 2 '
Proponents tend to shun this argument, however, on at least two
bases. Professor Thomas I. Emerson, a counterpart of Freund at
Yale Law School, has opposed his fellow professor saying: "Courts
are entirely capable of laying down the rules for a transitional period
in a manner which will not create excessive uncertainty or undue
disruption."2 2 Other proponents argue equally convincingly that the
mere fact that there might be litigation should not deter the Congress
from passing such a vital proposal and the states from ratifying it.
Representative Anderson of Illinois, espousing such a theory, quoted
from the President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities during debate on the amendment in the House of Representatives:
It is ironic that the basic rights women seek through this
amendment are guaranteed all citizens under the Constitution.
The applicability of the 5th and 14th amendments in parallel
cases involving racial bias has been repeatedly tested and sus3.7 U. S. CoNsr. art. V.

18See CONG. Q., Oct. 16, 1970, at 2550; Id., Oct. 23, 1970, at 2618; Id.,
Jan. 22, 1971, at 184.
19 See, e.g., 116 CoNG. REc. H7953-54 (remarks of Representative Griffiths),
H7960-63 (remarks of Representative White).
20 Quote cited 116 CONG. REc. H7962-63 (remarks of Representative Celler).
This assumption, however logical, may be combated with the fact that in 1967,
Delaware repealed all of its restrictive legislation and the courts have not as yet
felt any of these adverse effects. See 116 CoNG. REc. H7954 (remarks of Representative Griffiths); McPherson, That Sex Thing, Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.),
Sept. 24, 1970, § A at 9, col. 1.
21 116 CONG. REc. H7962-63 (remarks of Representative White, citing Professor22Paul Freund).
McPherson, supra note 20 at col. 4.
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tained, a process which has taken years and most millions of

dollars. 23
Anderson then asked:

"Do members who oppose the equal rights of women amendment

suggest that we should not have had those court cases; that we
should not have spent those millions
of dollars to test the validity
24

of the fifth and 14th amendments?
Perhaps the most ardent foe of the amendment, Representative
Emmanuel Celler of New York, 25 dean of the House 2 6 and Chairman
of the powerful House Judiciary Committee2 T (from whence the
amendment was brought to a vote by means of the extremely rare
"discharge petition" 28 after languishing for 47 years), 29 argued primarily
that the amendment should be defeated because it would invalidate
many state laws protecting women. This view was shared by Representative Martha Griffiths of Michigan, who led the House fight for
passage of the Amendment. She felt, however, that such protective
laws were generally undesirable and need to be invalidated.30
It is perhaps an exaggeration to oppose the amendment solely on
the ground of the ancient "opening of the floodgates" argument, as
Professor Freund has done. This should, however, be a consideration.
If a constitutional amendment were the only way to insure equal
rights, the question would solve itself; but this is not the case. As
will be discussed later there are many discernible trends, both judicial
and statutory, which point toward solutions of most of our undesirable
discrimination problems while not undermining that discrimination
which might be beneficial. That a chaotic constitutional amendment
might solve our problems is quite probable; that it is the best alternative is quite improbable.
B. Possible Effects
It would appear that the effects could be sweeping whenever (and
23 116 CONG. lEc.

24 Id.
25

H7967 (remarks of Representative Anderson).

Representative Celler strenuously opposed the amendment in debate in the
House.
2 See e.g., 116 CONG. BEc. H7948-49 (remarks of Representative Celler).
Representative Celler is a veteran of 48 years in the House. Them, supra
note 21, at 10.
7 Celler has headed the House Judiciary Committee since 1949, except for
1953-54, the years of Republican majorities. CONG. Q., supra note 15.
28 The discharge petition is a seldom-used device to allow a majority in the
House to bring to the floor legislation blocked by a legislative committee or the
Rules Committee. For a brief, but succinct, discussion of this device see CONG. Q.,
Id. at 2041.
29 116 CoNG. Bxc. H7976 (remarks of Representative Broomfield). It had
been 22 years since the Committee had even held hearings on the amendment.
Timm, supra note 1, at 10.
30 Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 5, 1970, § A, at 12, col. 1.
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to whatever) the amendment might be applied. Some possible
results, which will be discussed at length later, are:
1. Protective labor laws-Labor laws applying only to women
might be ruled unconstitutional. AFL-CIO spokesmen have argued
that protective legislation is needed to shield women from exploitation.31 Mrs. Griffiths and her allies contend, however, that many laws,
e.g., those barring women from working overtime, 32 simply keep
women out of better paying jobs and in reality do not protect them. 3
Where real protection is involved, it would seem that states could
comply with the amendment by broadening the provisions of their
laws to include men too.
2. The military draft-The amendment would probably make
women subject to military conscription. As to what this would mean
in a practical setting is confusing. It would seem highly likely that
if women were drafted their inherent physical conditions would tend
to restrict most of them to desk jobs rather than to actual field
participation. However, as Representative Shirley Chrisholm of New
York has said, "[A] robust woman could be more fit. . . than a weak
man."8 4 Surely great confusion could be wrought in this area.
3. Domestic law-It is also likely that laws concerning alimony,
child support, custody, divorce grounds, maternity, unequal marrying
ages, and bastardy would be affected drastically by the proposed
amendment. Notwithstanding the inequality in these areas, it is the
female who largely benefits.
4. Retirement plans-Laws involving unequal retirement ages for
men and women under Social Security or private plans could be
challenged under the Equal Bights Amendment. Likewise, statutes
which provide for survival benefits for one sex and not the other
could be held invalid.
5. Criminal law-Laws which provide for unequal sentences in
certain crimes depending upon sex would likely be ruled void. Also,
laws involving sex offenses, prostitution and abortion could be held
unconstitutionally discriminatory.
6. Juries-Statutes which allow exemptions to women and not
to men, or which require women to affirmatively declare they wish
to be jurors before they may be considered, could conceivably be
invalidated.
31
3

Tm, supra note 1, at 10-11.

2See e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350 (West 1937).
33 See, Louisville Courier-Journal, Supra note 30; 116 CoNG. REc. H79 53-54

(remarks of Representative Griffiths), H7969 (remarks of Representative Heckler).
34 116 CoNG. Eec. H7978 (remarks of Representative Chisholm). It is interesting to point out in this context that the Israeli and Viet Cong armies routinely
use women as combat soldiers. See Tnsd, supra note 1, at 11.
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It is the above mentioned areas to which the remainder of this
note will be addressed in depth.

II.

ENT LOYMMNT

Why do women desire equal rights in the area of employment?
It would seem that "hard, cold cash" is the compelling reason. 35 In
order to demonstrate this, employment will be broken down into
several illustrative areas showing "gaps" that exist today.
A. The Earnings Gap
That men do earn considerably more on the average than women36
may come as no shock. Yet the fact that the gap has been widening
rather than closing over the last few years may be cause for surprise.
For example, in 1958 the median earnings per year per full-time
woman worker was $3,102; for males the median was $4,927 a difference of $1,825.37 In contrast, the difference in 1962 was $2,34838
and in 1968, $3,207.8 9
B. The Opportunity Gap
The main reason for the difference in earning between male and
female workers seems to stem from the difference in jobs they are likely
to hold. More than 60 percent of the total number of women working
today are employed as clerical, service and sales people, or as household workers, 40 all of which can logically be considered lower paying
jobs. In contrast, only 21 percent of the male workers hold these
same types of jobs. 41 To further illustrate the disparity, it is interesting that about 70 percent of all male workers are employed as
professional and technical workers, managers, proprietors, craftsmen, foremen or factory workers, 42 all of which one may assume to
pay better wages.
So it is that women, who comprise 51 percent of the nation's
population 43 and hold 40 percent of the jobs,44 on the average earn
35 See U.S. NEws & Wonr. RP'. Apr. 13, 1970, at 37. [Hereinafter cited as
U.S. 3NEws, Apr. 13, 19701.
6In 1970 it is estimated that the average male high school graduate earned
$9,100, as compared to $5,280 for the average female high school graduate. 116
CONG. REc. H7964 (remarks of Representative Green).
37 U.S. NEws, Apr. 13, 1970, at 37.
38 d.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43

Tnvm, supra note 1, at 10.
116 CoNG. REc. H7980 (remarks of Representative Koch, citing TEsnmoNy
SusBmrrruD By m WoimN's RiGrrs Commrr= or NEw YoRK UN amsrry
(Continued on next page)
44
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42 percent less than men.45 Though these figures may not overly
surprise the average male, they should lead him down the seldom trod
path of thoughtfulness.
C. The Overtime Gap
Where women are limited in the number of hours they may work
it is reasonable to believe that men will generally possess the vast
majority of jobs where overtime pay is common. In 23 states and
the District of Columbia women are limited by "protective" laws to
an eight-hour working day or to 48 hours a week or both.46 Two
states set a maximum workweek of only 40 hours for women. 47 Such
laws can serve to "reject," rather than "protect," trapping women who
are in lower echelons by, denying both pay and opportunity, as choice
supervisory positions might often require a great deal of overtime
work.
D. The Qualifications Gap
Statistics indicate that even a good education does not guarantee
the average female a salary which can be favorably compared to a
man's. For instance, in 1970 a typical female who had had four
years of college training was earning about $7,930 per year,48 while
a typical male with merely an eighth-grade education was averaging
only $800 per year less.49 The typical male college graduate at this
same time, in contrast, was earning $13,300 per annum.50
E. The Unemployment Gap
Data from the United States Department of Labor show that
while overall unemployment rates for both men and women have
dropped in the last decade, the average rate for women has been
5.7 percent, while that for men has been 4.3 percent.51 Also, from a
nearly even rate in 1960, the unemployment rate for women
had by
52
1969 risen to over 167 percent of that the rate for men.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

SCHOOL OF LAW FOR IIEABNc;s CoNDucTD

ny nm HousE SUBCOMrzITTEE ON
June 30, 1970 [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. REPORT].
45
116
CONG.
REc. H7964 (remarks of Representative Green).
46
See 116 CoNG. REc. H7958 (remarks of Representative McCulloch, citing
DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF WomEN, 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WoRaEs,
STATE LAws FOR WOUMN).
47 Oregon and South Carolina. Id.
48 116 CONG. REc. H7964 (remarks of Representative Green).

EDUCATION,

49

Id.

50 Id.

51 U.S. NEws, Apr. 13, 1970, at 37.
52 4.7% for women, as compared to 2.8% for men. Id.
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F. The Experience Gap

That women are at a disadvantage in the labor market can also
be traced to the fact that there are more female newcomers to the
labor force than males; thus they are low in the seniority ranks.
Another Department of Labor report says that since 1948 the female
labor force has increased by about 13.8 million women while the
male force has risen by only 6.9 million.5 3
G. The Professional Gap
Statistics also tend to indicate that few women are entering the
lucrative professional fields. Females in this nation constitute only
nine percent of all professionals. 54 This includes eight percent of all
those in the "scientific" professions, 55 about 3.5 percent of all attorneys,55 and only one percent of all engineers. 57 An interesting item
is that women constitute only 6.7 percent of those in the medical
profession in the United States, while their counterparts in the Soviet
Union make up 60 percent of the total.58 Also, while a moderate
professional salary might be about $15,000, only 0.4 percent of all
women in this country have incomes exceeding this amount.59
The implications of the above statistics can be further illustrated
by a study of women faculty, as compared with men, at 39 representative law schools in the United States.60 The distribution amounts to
1,625 male faculty members as opposed to an anemic number of 35
females, 61 a ratio of over 46 to one. Of these 35 women, nine were
classified in librarian positions while only seven were of professional
rank.6 2 Thus our nation's law schools, the supposed bastions of equal
protection and fairness, have made a dubious mark in the area of
women's rights. But-and this would come as no consolation to women's
liberationists-the law schools are not alone by any means.
H. The Retirement Gap
The social security laws of the United States are a good example
of the express preference of one sex over the other. Under current
53 Id. at 86.
54

116

55 Id.

CoNG.

REc. H7964 (remarks of Representative Green).

56Id.
Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at H7980 (remarks of Representative Koch).
60 See 116 CoNG. REc. H7980-88, citing N.Y.U. REPORT, supra note 44, an
57

excellent study of women law school faculty members in the United States.
61 Id.at H7988.
62 Id,
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social security legislation a woman may retire with full benefits at
age 62 whereas a man cannot retire with the same full benefits until
age 65.63 Almost all of our social security programs are based upon
differences between men and women, and give women some special
64
advantage.
On the other hand, though a woman may spend her life paying
into the social security system, but if she lives with a husband until
retirement age she loses the benefits of these payments she had made
for years. 65 Likewise when a married woman pays into the system
for years and dies, her widower may receive nothing from her payments.6 6 In the Congress of the United States today, women members
contribute to a retirement fund that pays pensions to the widows of
Congressmen, but would pay no benefits to the surviving husband
67
of a Congresswoman.
Government does not have a monopoly on such sex discrimination
regarding pension plans; similar such preferential treatment is
found in industry. For instance, Illinois Bell Telephone has recently
been sued in federal court and charged with discrimination in the
firm's retirement policy which allows women to retire at 55 years of
age while men must wait until they are at age 60 to draw full benefits. 68
One can perceive without great difficulty the effect that the proposed amendment could have upon these and similar laws and company policies which prefer pension and retirement benefit payments
to one sex over the other. That equality would be served by an
invalidation of those laws is certain, but it seems that women would
often be "stepping down" to this equality.
Whether the Equal Rights Amendment becomes a reality remains
to be seen. As of now, however, the statistics point uniformly in one
direction: It is still a "man's world"-economically speaking.
III. STATE F11oTEc

LAWS

In the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
centuries, many states, led by Massachusetts in 1879,69 enacted labor
63 116 CONG. REc. H7961 (remarks of Representative White). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 402(a)-(b)(1935); Amendment of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, §§ 102(a)(e)

(1), (2)-(b) (8) (1961). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1935).

64 116 CONG. REc. H7961 remarks of Representative White).

65 Id. at H7974 (remarks of Representative Broyhill).
66 Id.
67U.S.
Nxws, Aug. 24, 1970, at 30.
68
69

See U.S. NEws, Oct. 12, 1970, at 80.
Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 1968

UTAH L. REv.
395 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383 (1876).
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laws for the protection of women workers.70 This state legislation
has had the effect of excluding many women from certain jobs by
"protecting" them. Such exclusions have been accomplished by enforcing maximum weight-lifting limits for women, 71 maximum hours legisnation for women7 2 and the absolute disqualification of women from
certain work areas.78
A. FederalRemedial Legislation
Legislation remedying women's inferior legal status has been slow
in development. The nineteenth amendment 74 guaranteed women the
right to vote but it did not achieve the political and civil equality
that was sought by proponents of women's rights. 75 The Equal Pay
Act of 196376 was enacted to eliminate widespread wage discrimination
against women,77 but, at least until 1967, the differential in income
between men and women had widened. 78 Finally the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,79 which will be discussed later, was enacted partially to
prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin or sex. 0
B. Early Case Law
Constitutional case law in the area of women's rights has been
perhaps as stagnant as remedial legislation has been slow. In a line
of cases starting with Muller v. Oregon8l in 1908, classification on
the basis of sex has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court
in Muller reasoned that because of the traditionally dependent role,
inferior strength, lack of assertiveness and society's need to protect
women, protective legislation was justified.82 The Muller case con70

For a listing of various types of state protective laws see 116 CONG. REc.

H7955-59.
71

See note 124 infra.

72 See note 125 infra.
73 See note 129 infra.

74 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX.
75 See Note, Classificationon the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
50 IowA L. Rxv. 778, 780 (1965).
70 29 U.S.C. § 206d (1964).
77

ComvnfirrE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88TH CONG., lsT Sass., LEGisLATIVE
7 8 HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 59-62 (Comm. Print. 1963).
CrrzNs ADvisoRY Co NCIL ON Tm STATUS OF Wo.mmn, REioRT OF THE
TASx FORCE ON LABOR STANDAnDS 19 (1968).
79 See note 92 infra.
8042

U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).

81208 U.S. 412 (1908). It is interesting to note that Muller is the case in

which the famous "Brandeis brief' originated. See Kanowitz, Constitutional
Aspects of Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law, 48 NEB. L. REv. 131, 135
(1968). [hereinafter Kanowitz]
82 208 U.S. at 421.
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cerned the validity of Oregon's law limiting women's hours of employment to ten a day, the plaintiff arguing that it violated the 14th
Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The determination by the Court was that if one was born male, the right
to contract in labor relations is part of the liberty of individuals that
is protected by the fourteenth amendment. The corollary to this rule
seems to be that such liberty is not absolute, and a state may restrict
many aspects of the individual's power to contract in relation to
employment if one is a female. The apparent justification for this
distinction was based on this declaration:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence
is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood
are upon her. Even when they are not... the physical well-being
of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order
to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always
been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset
by superior physical strength, and this control in various forms,
with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present.8 3
That the sole justification of Muller is the belief that woman is inferior to man becomes even more apparent from the following:
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be
performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the
capacity for long-continued labor ... and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed
to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. 84
The belaboring of quotations from this early, but landmark, case
hopefully is justified to demonstrate the eloquent legal expressions
which have steadfastly been used to justify sexual discrimination
against women. Professor Leo Kanowitz, a learned scholar on the
subject of women's rights, maintained in a recent article that statutes
allegedly protecting women-but in reality discriminating against
them because of their failure to extend said "protection" to include
men-will today require a much greater justification for interference
with woman's basic right to work. He further maintains that Muller
v. Oregon would probably not be decided the same way today. 5
Radice v. New York, 8 6 a case factually similar to Muller, held a
Id.
84 Id. at 422-23.
85 Kanowitz, supra note 81, at 136.
86 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
83
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New York statute prohibiting employment of women in restaurants
between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. was not contrary to
the freedom of contract. As in Muller, New York justified the law as
a health measure. The Court seemed impressed with the state
legislature's findings that a lost night's sleep cannot be made up
fully by day-time sleep, especially in large cities. [The legislation
had considered the delicate nature of the female and decided the
injurious consequences would hurt women much more than men].
Radice is a good illustration of the legal "razzle-dazzle" that courts
have used through the years to justify protective legislation. It is
somewhat unfortunate that this legislation is not altogether to protect
women from hazards to their health, but often acts to protect the
less delicate male from competition with females.
Perhaps the ultimate position adopted by the Supreme Court in
sex-discrimination legislation is found in Goesaert v. Cleary,87 decided
in 1948. This case held a statute restraining women's rights to tend
bar was not in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. The fact
that the statute allowed wives and daughters of male owners of liquor
establishments to do so was not deemed sufficient evidence for an
equal protection violation. Nor was the fact that waitresses were
allowed to serve liquor to patrons and thus be exposed to the unwholesome influence of a bar considered persuasive. The result in
Goesaert, however, is not as important as the Court's reasoning in
reaching it. The Court applied the "any rational basis" test for equal
protection purposes, stating that since the legislature's decision is
not without a basis in reason, the Court would not listen to arguments
that the legislature had had unchivalrous or other ulterior motives.88
This opinion as a whole gives rise to the feeling that the Court, relying
on Goesaert in the future, would validate any possible justification
for a distinction between men and women.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments are in the center of the
equal rights controversy. Most of the adversaries in debates over
the proposed amendment agree that the fourteenth amendment should
have served to give women the protection they now desire via the
new amendment. 89 Representative Griffiths, who led the House fight
for passage of the amendment, 90 has stated: 'Iagree the 14th Amend87 335 U.S. 464 (1948).

88 Id. at 467.
89 See, e.g., Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 5, 1970, § A, at 12, col. 1:
116 CONG. REc. H7974 (remarks of Representative Broyhill), H7967 (remarks of
Representative
Anderson).
9
o Mrs. Griffiths offered H.R.J. Res. 264 (The Equal Rights Amendment proposal) to the House of Representatives for consideration, as well as strongly
(Continued on next page)
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ment could do what the equal rights amendment would do, but what
opponents are ignoring is that the 14th hasn't done it. The Supreme
Court of the United States has never admitted the 14th Amendment
applies to women."91 This argument seems plausible in light of history.
A hundred years of equality enunciated under the Constitution for
the Blacks in America brought little actual progress. It took the
passage of affirmative legislation-the Civil Rights Act of 196492 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 93-to force action to achieve this principle of equality among races. Likewise, it took passage of equal pay
for equal work,9 4 the 19th Amendment providing the right to vote,95
and the inclusion of sex in the 1964 Civil Rights Act96 to force action
to achieve equality for women in those specific areas of concern. The
seeming default of the judicial system to grant equal protection of
the laws to women is one of the reasons the proposed Constitutional
amendment passed the House.
There is little doubt today that the Muller, Radice, Goesaertline of
cases is still good law, not having been reversed by the Supreme Court,
and that sex, insofar as constitutional law is concerned, is an allowable
basis for classification.9 7 However, the belief among legal scholars is
that these holdings would not stand if the Court were to decide the
same cases today.98 The question, then, would seem not to be whether
the fourteenth amendment is broad enough to include sex discrimination within its prohibitions, but rather when will the courts so hold.
Yet the belief that the courts may never do so on fourteenth amendment grounds may be precisely the reason that proponents are backing the new, more explicit amendment.
C. Civil Rights Act of 1964
It is the contention of this note that courts are already including
sex discrimination within the constitutional prohibitions in employment areas, and that such decisions are a result of the passage of the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

endorsing its passage during the ensuing debates. See 116 CONG. REC. H7953
(motion offered by Representative Griffiths), H7948, H7953-54 (remarks of
Representative
Griffiths).
91
McPherson, supra note 20, at col. 3.
955 U.S.C. §§ 2204, 2205 (1964); U.S.C. § 1447 (1964); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1964).
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-p (1965).
9 29 U.S.C. § 206d (1964).
95 U.S. CoNsT. amend.

MX.

96 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
97 See Kanowitz, supra note 81, at 186. See also Murray & Eastwood, lane
Crow and the Law: Sex Discriminationand Title VII, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REV.
232, 98
237 (1965).
E.g., Murray & Eastwood, supra note 97.
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Civil Bights Act of 1964. 99 This being true, it would seem that the
validity of the arguments for the proposed amendment would be
superfluous [insofar as discrimination in employment via state protective laws is concerned].
The Civil Bights Act of 1964 concerns primarily the ending of
discrimination against Blacks in employment, voting and their use
of public facilities and accommodations. 10 0 It constitutes an important
step in the realization of equal rights.'0 ' Extending earlier trends in
social legislation, 02 it is probably the most comprehensive civil rights
legislation passed by Congress. 0 3
Title VII 10 4 of the Civil Bights Act of 1964 is directed primarily
toward discrimination in employment. Of all the provisions within
the Act, it alone deals with sex-based discrimination. Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise

to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin ....
105

Title VII further provides that any person who feels he has been
discriminated against by an employer 08 because of one or more of the
above mentioned practices may file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to as EEOC], 10 7
which, if if finds reasonable cause to believe the charge, will attempt
to solve the problem through mediation with the parties. 0 8 If the
EEOC is not successful in its mediation effects, it so advises the charging party who may then sue in United States District Court for
damages. 0
99 Supra note 92.
100 The most significant provisions of the Act are: Title I (voting), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1964); Title II (public accommodations), 42 U.S.C. 2000a to a-6 (1964);
Title M (public facilities), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b to b-a (1964), and; Title VII
(employment), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
101 See Murray & Eastwood, supra note 97, at 235.
102 For an excellent general discussion see Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BRooxLYN L. REv. 62 (1964).
103 Id., See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).

105 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1964).
106 To be an employer under the Act a person must employ 25 or more

persons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5a (1964).
108 Id. For a succinct discussion of EEOC procedures see Hollowell, Women

and Employment: From Romantic Paternalism to the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
56 Wos'N L.J. 28, 80-81 (1970).
10942 U.S.C.

§ 200e-5(e) (1964). It is clear that the EEOC has little

actual power to force compliance with the Civil Bights provision. A movement
(Continued on next page)
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The legislative history-or lack of it-is interesting in regard to
deriving congressional intent in enacting the sex discrimination provisions of the Civil Bights Act. Originally the Act in no way mentioned
sex. At least some authorities believe that the opponents of the entire
Act added the sex provision in an attempt to jumble the bill and
facilitate attempts to halt its enactment."110 The prospects for enactment of legislation prohibiting sex discrimination were not bright in
1964."' If the sex provision had been presented separately from,
2
rather than being added to, the act, death would have been assured."1
Representative Edith Green of Oregon, a strong advocate of women's
rights, said in 1964 that if the legislation had been considered "by
itself, and.., brought to the floor with no hearings and no testimony
113 Just
... [it] would not [have] receive[d] one hundred votes."
4
one day before the Act was passed," Representative Howard Smith
of Virginia, an opponent of the original Civil Bights Bill, 1 5 amended
the bill to include sex as another prohibited basis for discrimination
in employment."16 Representative Smith claimed absolute seriousness
in offering the amendment, 1 7 but his motives nonetheless may be
suspect. The debates over the Act had continued for four months
and many southern congressmen and their allies had made efforts
to block its ultimate enactment, 1 8 and when the debate and the overriding congressional feeling" 9 at the time the amendment was offered
are considered, it is evident that the prevailing motive was to prevent
passage of the basic Act itself rather than a regard for women's
120
rights.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

has recently begun in Congress, however, to give it enforcement power. See
CONG. Q., March 19, 1971 at 610.
"1o For an in-depth discussion of the interesting historical incidents surrounding the sex provision of Title VII see Berg, supra note 102. See also Kanowitz,
Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAs=cs L.J. 305, 310 (1968).
111 Kanowilz, supra note 110, at 810-13.
112 Id. at 310.
"3 110 CONG. 1Ec. 2720 (1964) (remarks of Representative Green).
114 February 8, 1964.
"5 Kanowitz, supra note 110, at 310.
'16 110 CONG. RBc. 2577 (1964).
.7 Id.

Kanowitz, supra note 110, at 311.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 first took shape in committee in 1963,
the primary intention was the elimination of racial discrimination. See Hearings
"1
"9

on H.R. 7152, as Amended by Subcommittee No. 5, Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 4, pt. IV, at 2652-62 (1963) (statement of
the Attorney General). Furthermore, there was no consideration of such an
amendment by any committee. Berg, supra note 102 at 78. It is also interesting
to note that no organization in this country even petitioned Congress to add "sex
to Title0 VII. Note, supra note 75, at 791.
12 See Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law I: Law and
the Single Girl, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293 (1967); Note, supra note 75, at 791.
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To attempt to decide any case, then, upon the legislative intent
1 1
behind the sex provisions of Title VII would be somewhat fallacious. 2
It seems to be well settled that when legislation is adopted by Congress-especially that as important as the Civil Rights Act-and such
legislation is the object of a suit, counsel must infer some legislative
intent in order to carry out the policy of the legislature in passing the
law. It would be erroneous in this case, however, to attribute to the
Congress any motive as glorious as that of prohibiting employment
discrimination based upon sex, in light of the sex provision's dubious
history. Without any specific mandate from the lawmakers except
the wording of the Act itself, one must be satisfied that a national
agency (the EEOC) and the courts have been given responsibility
for developing workable principles vis-A.-vis the employment of women,
and that national policy is now in opposition to sex discrimination
in employment.
D. Protective Laws and the EEOC
At first glance it seems justified to predict that Title VII would
have far-reaching effects on the employment opportunities of women,
and it may. There are serious problems, however, in its interactions
with specific laws in most states which purport to "protect" female
employees by withholding their rights to various types of jobs on
the basis of sex. Several cases have been decided recently which tend
to bear this out,'2 2 and it is likely that in the near future federal courts
will be faced with many problems involving this conflict. A great
majority of states have such.laws to protect women in the field of
employment. 123 Common to these laws are provisions which limit
the amount of weight which may be lifted by women, 124 prescribe
121 The same statement might be made concerning the proposed amendment
if it is passed and ratified, at least insofar as the legislative intent in the House is
concerned. The Amendment was not discussed in any Committee of the House prior
to its adoption and total debate on the floor lasted only an hour. One of Representative Celler's main arguments against passage of the amendment resolution
was that it bad not been examined in his Judiciary Committee. It is not unreasonable to speculate that Representative Celler's motives may be analogized to Representative Smith's cited in the text, during debate on the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
It is also interesting to note that since the proposed amendment had been in the
House Judiciary Committee for 47 years, Celler could hardly maintain, in all
fairness, that the Committee had no time to consider it.
122 See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969)- Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 838 (D. Ore. 1969);
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Ward v.
Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. La. 1968).
123 For an exhaustive survey of state protective laws, the states in which they
and some of their effects see 116 CONG. Ec. H7955-59.
are found
124 Ten states have weight-lifting limitations: Alaska, California, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah and Washington. 116
CONG. REc.

H7958. See, e.g.,

CAL. LABOR CODE §

1251 (West 1955).
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maximum daily or weekly hours for women,'1 25 prohibit the employment of females in certain ocupations,'12 6 restrict employment before
or after childbirth, 1 27 limit night work for women 28 and confer special
129
benefits on them.
It is with such types of laws as the above that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 conflicts, since most of these laws restrict
women from certain jobs, while Title VII plainly prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. 30 The reason these laws have
not been completely obliterated by Title VII under the supremacy
clause'13 of the Constitution is that Title VII itself provides an exception to the general prohibition against sex discrimination, called
the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception. 3 2 This exception
states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice . . . to hire . . . on the
basis of ... sex... where ... sex... is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that
3
particular business or enterprise .... 13

From this it is clear that if an employer discriminates on the basis
of sex when there is no legitimate reason, he is guilty of violating
Title VII, e.g., if he hires a male dishwasher in preference to a female
dishwasher solely because of sex. If, however, an employer hires
125 41 states and the District of Columbia have established standards governing daily and/or weekly hours of employment in one or more industries: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. 116 CONG. BEG.
H7958. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 837.380 (1942) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
12626 states have comparable occupational limitations: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin,2 7and Wyoming. 116 CONG. R c. H7959. See, e.g., KRS § 244.100 (1942).
1 Six states do so: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Vermont,
and Washington. 116 CONG. REc. H7959.
128 In 18 states night-work for adult females is prohibited and/or regulated
in specific occupations of industries: California, Connecticut Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Id. at H7958.
129 12 states provide for specific rest periods, as distinct from regular meal
female workers: Alaska, Arizona California, Colorado, Kentucky,
periods,
Nevada, for
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah WasigoadWoig
d
at 17958. E.g., KRS § 337.865(1) (1958).
g. "
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
11 U.S. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
L33

Id.
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only males as attendants for a men's locker room, then sex might
legitimately be a bona fide occupational qualification and the discrimination therefore lawful. The only possible means, then, of conforming state protective laws to Title VII is to find that the employment practices required by them qualify for the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
As has been stated, the EEOC was set up to administer the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. To this Commission has been delegated the duty
to determine what bona fide occupation qualifications are, 84 a difficult task indeed due to the lack of any clear legislative guidelines.
What, then, does the EEOC consider a bona fide occupational qualification? Generally speaking, when the EEOC adopted its "Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex"' 8 5 it did so with the inference that
state protective legislation would be abrogated and that it would
interpret the bona fide occupational qualification exception narrowly
in sex discrimination cases.136 Subsequent decisions by the EEOC
would appear to bear this out.' 37 In the maximum hours and weightlifting areas of state protective laws, the position of the EEOC has
been that there is no justification for treating women differently in
these areas, 88 and therefore these statutes do not operate as bona fide
occupational qualifications1 39 The practical effect of this policy then,
is that Title VII preempts this field from the states by way of the
supremacy clause.
The EEOC's position is sound. It should go without saying that
much of the state protective legislation is contrary to Title VII. Given
this assumption, it must be remembered that the EEOC is only a
policy and guideline-making, conciliatory and mediating agency and
thus its opinions, no matter how correct and persuasive, have no actual
binding effect. 140 The question remains as to whether the courts will
adhere to this sound reasoning and policy.
E. Current Case Law
There is a definite and discernible trend in current cases toward
implementation of the narrow sex discrimination policies of the EEOC.
If this trend continues it will no doubt cast the validity of state
protective laws in doubt. Perhaps the most widely cited case in this
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1968).
'36 Id.at § 1604.1(a) (1968).
1442
'35

137

See, e.g., B.N.A.,

LABOR

RELATIONS

REPORTERm,

FAia EMPLOYMENT

2 F.E.P. Cases 78, 119, 165 (1969).
8038, 8079, 8085 (1969).
138 C.C.H., EMPLOYMENT PRAcicES GuiDE U11

PRACTICE

CASES,

139 Id.
140

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
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area is that of Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Company.141 Though Bowe
itself did not deal with a state protective law per se, its analogy to
such laws and the possible application of the decision to them demands
that it be discussed within the protective law context. In this case
the plaintiffs were women who were employed by Colgate at a plant
in Indiana. Colgate restricted females to jobs requiring the lifting
of no more than 35 pounds. This restriction, however, was not mandated by an Indiana protective weight-lifting statute, but was a
142
company policy based upon certain protective laws on the job.
The Circuit Court held on these facts that Colgate could maintain its
35 pound requirement as a guideline for all employees, but that each
worker has to be considered on an individual basis, and broad class
stereotypes based upon sex cannot be for use in deciding who is to
get a certain job, i.e., each worker able to show an ability to perform
the strenuous work would be allowed to apply for the position and
receive equal consideration.
Perhaps the facet of Bowe that is most important is the intimation
by the Court that the state protective laws upon which Colgate based
its 35-pound limit are no longer valid precedent, but are preempted
by Title VII. If this perceptive reasoning is accepted by other jurisdictions, perhaps a valuable guideline upon which states with protective laws may base remedial legislation will have been established.
Further, this might persuade states to facilitate legislative changes
before the courts force the changes upon them.
Another important case continuing the seeming trend toward the
EEOC's interpretation of what constitutes a bona fide occupational
43
qualification is that of Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company,
decided prior to Bowe, which was based upon the refusal of
Southern Pacific to allow the plaintiff to take a position to which she,
by virtue of her seniority, was qualified above any other applicant.
The criteria upon which the company based its refusal were California's
wage and hour laws. 144 The court held that this protective legislation
did not constitute a bona fide occupational qualification and thus
violated Title VII by discriminating against women on the basis of
the laws were contrary to the
sex. The court further held that
145
supremacy clause and thus void.
141

416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).

a general discussion of the variances among weight-lifting maximums
in the states that have such statutes see 416 F.2d at 717-18.
143 293 F.Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
144 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1251, 1850 (West 1945).
142 For

145 It should be mentioned that the court in Rosenfeld went on to state that
the protective laws were discriminatory because the standards set by the statute

(Continued on next page)
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A continuation in the trend is found in a 1969 case, Richards v.
Griffith Rubber Mills.1 46 In the Richards case the plaintiff was denied
a position for which she had the requisite seniority because a clause
in the union contract required that all female workers receive two
ten-minute rest breaks, and a state protective provision 147 limited the

amount of weight a female employee could lift to 30 pounds. The court
discussed the aged landmark of Muller v. Oregon but finally held that
Title VII now requires that persons be judged as individuals and not
grouped on the basis of sex. The court stated that even if the protective laws could be held valid under the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment such laws were no longer permitted because of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 via the supremacy clause. 14 Clearly a
trend is forming.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company149 is a
case with facts much the same as the previous cases. It concerned a
Georgia regulation which prevented an employer from requiring any
employee to lift any weight which might cause undue strain.150
Though this statute was much more liberal than the one in Richards,
the court found that it was vague and that the company did not
prove a bona fide occupational qualification. In its opinion the court
stated that it gave great weight to the interpretation of a bona fide
occupational qualification by the agency charged with its administration-the EEOC.151 The court then further declared:
Title VII rejects... romantic paternalism as unduely Victorian and
instead vests individual woman with the power to decide whether
or not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right
to determine whether the incremental increase in remuneration for
strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is
worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now
to be on equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including the
bona fide occupational qualification exception Congress intended to
renege on that promise. 152
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

were too low. That the court partially based its opinion on this is somewhat disappointing in that it seems to leave the door open to allow women to be limited
in weights they may lift. It is preferable--perhaps hopeful-to think that the court
intended by its language to abrogate such discrimination. Either way, Rosenfeld
is a decided step forward, albeit the size of the step is debatable.
146 800 F.Supp. 888 (D.Ore. 1969).
147 This provision was mentioned in the text of the case only as "Manufacturing Order No. 8" of the Wage and Hour Commission of Oregon. Id. at 840.
148
149

Id.

408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
250 The defendant relied upon Rule 59 promulgated pursuant to
§54-122(d) (1945). Id. at 282.
'5' Id. at 285.
152 Id. at 286.

GA. CODE
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The reasonable conclusion to be derived from this opinion is that
all weight legislation restricting women more than men is discriminatory under Title VII and thus void. That the bona fide occupational
qualification exception should be so narrowly construed is a necessity
to insure the maximum effectiveness of the reform tendencies of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The preceding line of cases seems to establish a definite trend
toward displacement of state protective laws by Title VII, where
they cannot be shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification.
It must be remembered, however, that these cases are lower federal
cases and cannot be said to be the law of the land as yet. Another
case, however, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation,153 has given
some indication as to how the Supreme Court feels on the subject.
In Phillips, like Bowe, a case not dealing directly with a state protective law but with issues closely analogous to this area, the issue
revolved around whether Martin Marietta Corporation could refuse
to consider a woman with pre-school children for a certain position
while at the same time considering for the same position men with
pre-school children. The EEOC found that this constituted sex discrimination but failed in its efforts to reach conciliatory agreement
between the parties. When Mrs. Phillips then sued the corporation,
it took the position that its practice of not hiring women with preschool age children was not in itself discrimination based solely on
sex, and that the plaintiff had to prove that women as a group were
treated unfairly, rather than merely women with pre-school age children. The plaintiff felt, however, that where an otherwise valid
disqualification standard is applied discriminately to only one sex, as
here, then there is a definite violation of the Act.
Despite the definitely more persuasive argument of the EEOCbacked plaintiff and the court's own admission that there was probably
discrimination against women in the case,15 4 the holding in the Fifth
Circuit was ultimately in favor of the defendant corporation. The
court in an exercise of judicial falderal said: "When another criterion
of employment is added to one of the classifications listed in the Act,
there is no longer apparent discrimination based solely on . . .sex
...
155 and further declared that the court must study the additional

criterion along with the classifications listed in the act (i.e., sex) to
determine if there is discrimination based on sex.156 In its ultimate
153 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971). For a more detailed discussion of the facts and
analogous cases see 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
154 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969).

15 411 F.2d at 3-4.
156 411 F.2d at 3-4.
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holding the court stated that Congress intended that discrimination
in such a case should not be classified as sex discrimination. This is
unsound in light of the complete lack of any legislative intent concerning the sex provisions when the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed,
as has been discussed.
The Supreme Court, in reviewing Phillips, found that the Court
of Appeals had erred in reading the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men-each
having pre-school age children. 1 7 If such family obligations [preschool children] were shown to be more relevant to a woman's job
performance than a man's, there could arguably be a basis for distinction under the Act. The Court, then, vacated the summary judgment for Martin Marietta determining that the record was inadequate
to decide if the condition in question was a bona fide occupational
qualification. It is apparent that the Court has used Phillips as a
timely vehicle by which to indicate its position when a case concerning
a purely protective law reaches it.
Based upon the preceding discussion of the effects of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 on state protective laws and other employment
discrimination cases it is contended here that the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment to the Constitution is not needed to any great
degree. The trend is clear: Federal Courts are, on a case-by-case
basis, progressively superceding discriminatory state protective legislation via Title VII and the Supremacy Clause. It would be superfluous, then, to pass and ratify such an amendment unless there are
overriding needs elsewhere that demand it. It is further submitted
that some vital and needed protective legislation such as maternity
leave for women and health provisions would be abolished along with
the unfair legislation. The direction of this note must, then, turn to
other fields of law in order to discern whether the proposed amendment is needed and what effects it might have on these areas.
IV. CRUMNAL LAW

A. Unequal Sentencing
In the realm of criminal law, women are often treated differently
than men. One such example is that of states imposing higher
357 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971). In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall voiced
disagreement with the court's indication that a bona fide occupational qualification
could be established by showing that even the majority of women with pre-school
age children have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance and
that men usually do not have such responsibilities. The Court, Marshall said, has

(Continued on next page)
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penalties on a woman who commits a certain crime, such as prostitution, than on a man who is a party to the same crime. 158 The constitutionality of such dispositionate penalties for women has been
recently challenged in two important cases.
In Commonwealth v. Daniels, 59 a woman first sentenced to a term
of from one to four years for a crime was later resentenced to up to
ten years on the basis of Pennsylvania's Muncy Act, 160 which provided
that a female imprisoned for a crime of more than one year must be
sentenced to the State Industrial Home for Women and that the
sentence should be general and unlimited in duration up to a maximum
point. Thus, under the Act, for a crime with a usual sentence of from
one to ten years, a man might have been sentenced from one to four
years whereas a woman would get an indefinite term of up to ten
years. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court in Daniels, stating
that longer imprisonment of females is reasonable because of "the
physiological and psychological make-up of women . . ."161 This
statement did not convince the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, as that court held that women are entitled to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, and that the sentence of ten
62
years for women as opposed to four years for men is unconstitutional.
The court declared that, "an arbitrary and invidious discrimination
exists in the sentencing of men to prison and women to [the] Muncy
163
[Act], with resulting injury to women."
It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Daniels did not completely reject the validity of any discrimination
based upon sex, such as in the employment area, stating that there
are "significant . . . differences between men and women under
some circumstances." 6 4 The wisdom and perception of the judiciary
is sometimes overwhelming.
In a case analogous to Daniels, United ex rel. Robinson v.
York, 165 a United States District Court, in Connecticut, held a Con(Footnote continued from preceding page)

"fallen into the trap of assuming that the [Civil Rights Act] permits ancient

commands about the proper role of women to be the basis for discrimination."
Id. at 498.
158 See, e.g., statutes upheld in Ex parte Gosselin 44 A.2d 882 (Me. 1945);
Platt v. Commonwealth, 152 N.E. 914 (Mass. 1926); Ex parte Brady, 157 N.E. 69
(Ohio 1927).

159
232 A.2d 247 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1967).
6 0
'
PA. STAT. tit. 61, § 566 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1969).
161 282 A.2d 247, 252 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1967).
162 243 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1968).
163 Id. at 403.
164 Id.

165

281 F.Supp. 8 (D.Conn. 1968).
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necticut statute, 166 much like Pennsylvania's Muncy Act, unconstitutional as being a denial of equal protection guarantees. The Connecticut statute allowed females to be incarcerated for terms lengthier

than those dealt to men for the same offenses.
The Robinson and Daniels opinions are important for at least two
reasons. First, they cast doubt upon the constitutional validity of
earlier cases in other jurisdictions which upheld sex discrimination as
being constitutional in sentencing for crimes. 167 The decisions also
seem to indicate a trend, in the criminal law area, disfavoring the
theory that sex is a legitimate classification criterion. By their holdings,
these cases also seem to continue the general trend, as evidenced by
decisions in the employment areas, that the equal treatment for
men and women in America may be approaching reality within the
judicial system without the aid of a constitutional amendment.
B. Prostitution

Another area of criminal law in which the law often discriminates
against women is that of prostitution. All states make prostitution
illegal, 168 and public opinion within the United States has long been
opposed to prostitution. 109 Yet in most states males cannot be directly
70
punished for availing themselves of the services of a prostitute.
If, however, their acts fall within a broad penumbra of other normally
criminal areas, e.g., fornication, 171 lewdness 172 or solicitation,' 73 they
may be sanctioned indirectly. The inequity arises because not all
174
states have such crimes as fornication, lewdness and solicitation,'
and even in states which do have such statutes, loose interpretations
have often caused the release of the male customer.175 Perhaps even
more important is the fact that though male participants in the act of
prostitution may legally and theoretically be punished in many states
for connected immoral acts, lower officials often "wink" at such
participation and prosecution rarely occurs.' 7 6 It is reasonable to
perceive from these assertions that women are bearing the burden
160 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
167 See, e.g., note 158 supra.

17-360 (1958).

108 E.g., KRS § 436.075 (1942).

169 See George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerationsin the Control
60 MicH. L. REv. 717 (1962).
of Prostitution,
0
17 See Kanowitz, supra note 120, at 310.
171 E.g., KRS
172 E.g., KRS
173
74 E.g., id.

§ 436.070 (1942).
§436.075(2) (1942).

1 See Kanowitz, supra note 120, at 310, citing
oF SExruAL CONDUCT (1961i).
175

Id.

176 Id. at

311.
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for a criminal offense which involves men as well. It is equally reasonable to predict that the new Equal Rights Amendment, if passed
and ratified, would in all likelihood abrogate existing state laws which
punish women for prostitution and not men. This would be only
just, for equality demands that the consequences of a criminal act
should either be taken from women or added indiscriminately to men
when both are involved in the act.
C. Statutory Rape
In the area of statutory rape, it is often found that it is men who
are discriminated against rather than women. For instance, most
states provide statutory penalties for carnal knowledge by a male of
a female under a certain age, 177 whereas only a few states provide
punishment for an adult woman who has sexual relations with a boy
under a certain youthful age. 178 In People v. Ratz,179 an early California case, the court stated that the goals of the laws on statutory rape
are the protection of society, of the family and of minors. It can be
reasoned that these goals still apply in current statutory rape statutes.
The majority of statutory rape statutes, then, do not completely meet
the goals upon which they are based because of their discrimination
between males and females. It is not to be denied that a woman can
be as much of an influence upon the morals of a young boy as a man
upon those of a young girl. It is submitted that these discriminatory
statutes would ultimately be made unconstitutional by the proposed
amendment.
D. Abortion
On first impression, sex discrimination in criminal abortion laws
is not readily recognizable. It may be argued that regulation of
abortion does not prefer one sex over the other since punishment is
usually applicable to anyone who performs an abortion or procures
a female for an abortion, 8 0 as well as the woman on whom it is
performed. Nevertheless, sex discrimination is intrinsically present in
these laws. An instance exemplifying this discrimination occurs when
a woman, because of fear and anxiety due to social problems, decides
the pregnancy must be aborted. Most physicians, unwilling to break
laws which make abortions illegal, will refuse to operate, thus forcing
the woman to submit to an illegal abortion, which is frightening,
177 Id. at 312. See, e.g., ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3151 (1964); FLA.
STAT. 78§ 794.05 (1961); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (1955).
1 Kanowitz, supra note 120, at 313.
179 49 P. 915 (Cal. 1896).
180 E.g., KRS § 436.020 (1942).
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and often fatal as well.'"' Thus restrictive abortion laws force women
to have them illegally and therefore, rather than protecting the health
of women, constitute a present threat to their health. The inequality
arises when the male involved with the woman desires to have the
abortion consummated. Though men are often subject to criminal
prosecution for their involvement in helping procure the abortion,
the criminal abortion statutes have not caused them to be killed or
internally maimed at the hands of an unskilled and unsanitary butcher.
The inequality of the law, then, is apparent, if not in the inequity of
the statutes per se, at least in their practical effects. However, the
breezes of change have begun to stir in a few instances signaling at
least a glow of hope for abortion reform. California's Supreme Court
in People v. Belous 182 recently held that an abortion statute

83

was

unconstitutionally vague in its criterion that abortions could only be
procured when there was substantial risk of impairing the health of
the mother 8 4 and stated, albeit dictum, that:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children follows from the Supreme Court's and this Court's repeated acknowledgment of a "right of privacy" or "liberty" in
matters related to marriage, family, and sex .... That such a right

is not enumerated in either the United States or California Constitutions is no impediment to the existence of the right. 185
The United States Supreme Court refused, 6 without comment, to
8
review the opinion of the California Court.
s7
In a recent opinion, U. S. v. Vuitch, the Supreme Court held
that a District of Columbia abortion statute was constitutionally clear
and the Court stated that prosecutors in the District are still free to
bring charges under the law, which forbids abortions except by
physicians when the mother's life or health is at stake. However, the
prosecution must prove that the operation was performed without a
medical judgment having been made. This interpretation, which
seems to include mental health as well as physical health, definitely
181 It is estimated that there are 10,000 deaths a year caused by illegal
abortions, due not so much to the operation itself but to the barbaric means used
to induce these abortions. See Truinger, Abortion: The New Civil Right, 56
WommrN LJ.99 (1970). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that illegal abortions
rank as the largest single cause of maternal death each year. Fisher, The Case For
Abortion: A Plea For Unrestrictive Laws, 56 WoMmN LJ.95, 96 (1970).

458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 920 (1969).
CODE § 274 (1872) as amended by CAL. HEALTH & PuBLIc
SAFETY
1 84 CODE §§ 25, 950-54 (West 1967).
CAL. HEALTH & PUBLIC SAFET CODE § 25,952(c)(1) (West 1967).
185 458 P.2d at 199-200 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, - (1969).
18690
S. Ct 920 (1969).
87
1 No. 84 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1971).
182

183 CAL. PEN.

YE
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gives physicians great leeway and places the burden where it should
be-on the prosecution.
While the Court has failed to settle the questions of privacy and
freedom of choice in this area, it did agree recently to consider the
question later.' 88 If the apparent liberal trend continues, a great
upheaval in state abortion laws could then be at hand.
A breakthrough in State laws, based on new statutes in Alaska,
189
Hawaii and New York, is being witnessed around the country.
None of these three states now specify any grounds for abortion and
leave the decision solely to the woman and physician involved' 90 as
opposed to the other states which require necessity to preserve life
or similar grounds. 191
The legal arguments that the fetus can inherit property and
recover for tortious injury cannot logically be absolute, 92 and must
be balanced against the rights of the mother and the probable future
of the child. The physically or mentally impaired, unwanted and
unloved child faces a bleak life.
Considering the definite liberal trend exemplified by the cases
and statutes cited, it is submitted that it would be more desirable
and practical to utilize the case-by-case method as a vehicle for
abortion reform rather than to rely upon a radical and disruptive
panacea such as the proposed constitutional amendment.

V. Dommsmc

LAW

A. Divorce Grounds
Sex discrimination in various state statutes concerning grounds
for divorce is very common. 193 A typical example is the Alabama
statute which provides that a husband may obtain a divorce from his
wife when the wife was pregnant at the time of their wedding without
his knowledge or collusion. 94 Other states have similar laws' 95 but
none allow a wife to divorce her husband if he has caused another
woman, not his wife, to become pregnant prior to the marriage.
88
- Doe v. Bolton, No. 971 (U.S. May 3, 1971); Roe v. Wade, No. 808 (U.S.
May 3, 1971).
189 U.S. DEPT. OF LAIOn, WAGE AND STANDARDs ADMIN., WOmEN's BURFAu,

ABORlTION LAWs

4 (1970).

190 Id. at 5.
19' Id. at 6.
192 W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
19 3 See Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law I: Law and

the Married Woman, 12 ST. Louis U. L.J. 3, 63-67 (1967), for an in-depth discussion
of this area.
194
ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 21 (1958).
195 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102(5) (1952).
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One instance in which a woman is preferred over her husband is
found in Alabama where a wife Miay obtain a divorce from her
drug-addicted husband, but the husband may not divorce his wife
for the same reason."' 6 Likewise, in Kentucky a husband can divorce
his wife on the grounds of her mere drunkenness, 97 while she must
show the additional factor that her husband's inebriation was accompanied by the wasting of his estate in detriment to the 98family's
well-being before being granted a divorce on this ground.1
These examples show instances of the discrimination that is being
practiced in the family law divorce area by virtue of some statutes,
as well as showing the absurdity of requiring "grounds" for divorce.
It could be reasonably expected that such laws as these would be
voided by passage and ratification of the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment.
B. Family Support Laws
The universal rule in all the states is that the husband is obligated
to support his family. 199 In most jurisdictions a husband's willful
failure to do so constitutes a crime.200 No matter how morally justified
this might be when practical circumstances are considered, there is
still patent discrimination in relation to the statutes which adhere to
this universal rule.201 No longer would support be primarily a man's
responsibility if the proposed equal rights amendment became law.
It could well become the responsibility of the parent most able to
support the child or determination could be made upon the comparative abilities of the parents. Thus, considering the changing role
of women in society, the Equal Rights Amendment could well abrogate
those existing support laws which place the burden upon the father.
C. Alimony
In the same position as family support payment statutes are those
the responsibility to make alimony
which place upon the divorced male
202
payments to his former spouse..
It is now the general rule that in the absence of fault on the
part of the woman, or on the showing of less fault than the male
196 See Kanowitz, supra note 196, at 67.
197 KRS § 403.020(4) (b) (1962).
198 KRS § 403.020(3) (a)(1962).
1_9 Kanowitz, supra note 193, at 39. See also Paulsen, Support Rights and
Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv. 712 (1956).
Duties
20 0
Paulsen, supra note 199, at 789.
201 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 90 (1919); N.Y. DomEsTic RELATIONS LAws
§ 32 (McKinney 1949).

202 E.g., KRS § 403.060 (1942).
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spouse a woman may be awarded alimony. 20 3 The usual justifications
for such awards are based upon a desire by the state to continue its
basic family support policies; to prevent the woman from becoming
a public welfare charge, or to punish the man for misconduct during
marriage.204 Statutes which follow this general approach will doubtless go the way of many support statutes if the new amendment
becomes operative. The ultimate solution by the states in such cases
would have to be in the form of abolishing all alimony, which is unlikely, or forcing divorced women to pay alimony to their former
husbands where the woman is working and the man 'has no estate of
his own'-the standard often applied to decide whether a woman
20 5
should receive alimony.
D. Child Custody
Many courts now give custody of minor children to the mother
unless she is found to be unfit.20 6 Kentucky, as an example, follows
20 8
this rule to clarify its custody statute.207 In Thiesing v. Thiesing,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that where there is nothing
tending to show the wife is wanting in any quality needed for the
raising of children, custody should be awarded to her. 20 9 Likewise, in
Stafford v. Stafford 210 the Court stated that custody of a child under
natural principles should be given to the mother as long as there is
no strong reason to deny her such custody.2'1 The discrimination is
apparent in these cases, and it is readily foreseeable that if the Equal
Rights Amendment is passed and ratified, practices and policies like
these could be challenged by fathers all over the United States.
E. Loss of Consortium
At early common law, although a husband could recover for the
loss or impairment of the consortium of his wife, the wife could
not likewise recover for the loss or impairment of her husband's
consortium.212 This common law rule has now been modernized in
some jurisdictions to allow women the same right of recovery for such
203 Kanowitz, supra note 193, at 44.
204 Td.
205 See,

e.g., KRS § 403.060 (1942).
E.g., Barr v. Barr. 437 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1968); Akin v. Akin, 258
N.E.2d
2 829 (Ill. 1969); See U.S. Nr-ws, supra note 85, Aug. 24, 1970, at 30.
o7 KRS § 403.070 (1942).
208 26 S.W. 718 (Ky. 1894).
209 Id.
210 155 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1941).
211 Id. at 222.
212 See Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Mo. 1963).
206
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loss as men,213 but the denial of such rights remains in most states.
It is reasonable to assume that, where women are still denied the right
to sue for the loss of consortium, the proposed amendment would
overrule the statutes and cases upon which the states base such
practices.
In the area of family law it can readily be predicted that the
Equal Bights Amendment could, if given strict interpretation by the
courts, cause a great upheaval in the laws and practices of many
states. Resolving the inherent conflicts among the traditional role of
the female, the American theory of equality for all, and the practical
consideration within our changing society is manifestly difficult and
not within the scope of this note. It does seem necessary to say,
however, that in theory all citizens should be equal; but in these
domestic areas, as in others previously mentioned, women are often
"more equal" than men. Women should consider whether they wish
to risk the loss of such benefits derived from this inequality by
advocating the passage of the new amendment. This is a complex
area where women may gain a drab equality while losing a decidedly
advantageous inequality.

VI. TBE DRAFr
It is the opinion of Representative Griffiths that women would be
subject to military service equally with men should the amendment
be passed and ratified.12 4 Opponents of the amendment hold the same
view but foresee results differing from those predicted by the amendment's proponents.2 1r Those who oppose the amendment seem to
have visions of American women driving tanks, much as Russian
women did during the last World War,210 or bearing rifles, as Cuban
females do even today.217 Representative Dennis seemed to echo
his colleagues opposing the amendment when he stated before the
House during the debates on the amendment:
Conscription is objectionable enough... where men are concerned,
but I can think of no more far-reaching social change, nothing more
likely to destroy the family unit, nothing so likely to threaten to
transform us into a national socialist type of state, than to conscript
American women into the Armed Forces.
213 E.g., KRS § 411.145(2) (1970). See Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260
F.Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 150
N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1967).
214 116 CONG. REC. H7953 (remarks of Representative Griffiths).
215 E.g., 116 CONG. REc. H7960 (remarks of Representative Dennis).
210 U.S. Nmvs, supra note 85, Aug. 24, 1970, at 30.
217

Id.
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I wonder, indeed, whether anybody here really wants
this.
218
I wonder whether we have thought the thing through.

Proponents of the amendment "pooh-pooh" these arguments. Representative Green points out that women already serve in the military
and do not serve in the field, and in practice they would not be
required to do anything for which they are not capable. 219 She also
sees a boon to women in that the amendment would presumably
allow them entrance into the military academies. 220
Representative Shirley Chisholm goes even further, declaring that
since men are oppressed by the draft, women should also be required
to serve and defend the country.22 ' In citing further non-detrimental
effects Mrs. Chisholm alluded to the vocational aspects of military
affiliation stating before the House: "Since October 1966, 246,000
young men who do not meet the normal mental or physical requirements for military service have been given opportunities for training
and correcting physical problems. This opportunity is not open to
222
their sisters."
There is, then, agreement on all sides that the Equal Rights
Amendment would profoundly effect the military system in that
females as well as males would have to be drafted. While agreeing
with this broad assumption, it is submitted that in practical application the amendment would have little real effect on the draft situation.
Assuming the amendment is someday passed by Congress, in all likelihood it would probably take many months to be ratified by the
necessary three-fourths of the states, and a year after ratification to
take effect. But who is to say that there will even be a draft by the
time the amendment would go into effect? It is the avowed policy of
the Nixon Administration to abolish the draft by 197223 This timetable would seem to be nearly the same for both the prospective
operative date of the amendment and the abolition of the draft, assuming both take place. The hypothesis is thus clear: If there is no
draft both sexes will be equally not drafted-the amendment would
have no real effect.2 24 As a second proposition, it would seem apparent
that the physical differences between men and women would render
women less likely to meet physical standards for initiation into the
218 116 CONG. REC. H7960 (remarks
219 TimE, supra note 1, at 11.
220 Id.
22 1

U.S. NEws, Aug. 24, 1970, at 30.
H7977 (remarks of Representative Chisholm).

222 116 CONG. REc.
223 See N.Y. Times,
224

of Representative Dennis).

July 24, 1970, at 63, col. 3; July 30, 1970, at 13, col. 3.

This hypothesis disregards a possible later reinstatement of the draft.
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rigors of basic training, a venture which equality would seem to
demand.
As a whole, it seems apparent that the Equal Rights Amendment
would subject both sexes equally to the draft and thus force America
a step further up the road of equality. But once again, the question
unanswered is whether the equality gained by the woman is worth
the price she would have to pay?
VII. Jumy AssiGNmFNTs
At common law, the right to trial by jury meant trial by a jury
composed exclusively of males 2 25 This practice has been severely
limited through the years, 226 but is still prevalent in many states as a
227 although no states now expressly exclude women
practical matter,
2 28
from juries.
Insofar as the constitutionality of excluding women from juries is
concerned, the Supreme Court has not directly spoken since 1879
when in Strauder v. West Virginia229 it stated as dictum that a state
may constitutionally confine jury duty to males. In 1961 the Court in
30 did uphold the constitutionality of a Florida statute
Hoyt v. Florida,2
which, while not denying women the right to serve on juries, did not
require them to do so unless they made their desire known to an appropriate official. 23 ' The Court, it seems, skirted the big issue of discrimination in deciding this case and thus missed its chance to rewrite
jury law.

The Florida statute is only an example of many state laws which
do not exclude women from jury duty per se, but exempt them on
the basis of sex alone because they have children, or because they
do not specifically appear to volunteer for service. 232 These types of
statutes tend to discriminate between men and women in that they
862 (6th ed. 1774).
226 Fisher, Women as Jurors: The Status of Women as to Jury Service, 33
225 8 W. BLACSTONE, ComMENTAREmS

A.B.A.J.
227 113 (1947).
As of 1962 only 21 states permitted women to serve on juries on the
same basis as men. See REPORT OF ME CONDvi'N OF CIVIL & PoLITIcAL RIGHTS TO
TH PRESMDEN'S COiNEmiN ON THE STATUS OF WOMxii 13, table 1 (1968) [hereinas CCPR].
after 2cited
28
In 1968 the last three states to do so, Alabama, Mississippi and South
Carolina, revised their statutes to allow women to serve on juries. See ALA. CODE
tit. 80 § 21 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (1968); S.C. CODE § 38-52, (1968).
229 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
U.S. 57 (1961).
230368
2 31
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (1961).
232 CCPR REPORT, supra note 227, at 13, table 1. For a list of various state
jury exemptions allowable to women see Note, Jury Service for Women, 12 FLA.
L. REv.224 (1959).
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exempt women where men are not similarly exempted. The fact is
obvious that neither men nor women ever mob the courthouse to apply
for jury service and to require women, because of sex or any other
criterion, to register in person for jury duty is tantamount to exclusion.
The same is true for automatic exemption for women. These exemptions tend to force inequitable burdens upon plaintiffs or defendants as
well as deny equal treatment to would-be women jurors.
The effect of the Equal Rights Amendment could be very interesting in the realm of jury service. This is once again an area in which
women are often granted concessions that men are not. Laws that
permit women to be excused from jury service for some sex-related
reason either make women second-class citizens, or citizens of a "V.I.P."
nature, depending upon one's point of view. It is contended here
that women might lose a valuable asset in many states (assuming that
people do not generally like to serve on juries) in exchange for
"stepping down" to equality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is concluded from the above material that adoption of the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution
would not be advantageous at this time.
It is true that there is gross sex discrimination and inequality in
the area of employment and state protection laws. Further, these
inequities demand an immediate remedy and it must be conceded
that the amendment would be such a remedy. It would wipe the
slate clean of such discriminatory laws, socially good or evil, in one
"full sweep." This might create a case, however, where the medicine
not only kills the unhealthy cells, but the healthy ones as well. Many
protective laws do discriminate against women and have the effect
of keeping them from more lucrative positions purely on arbitrary
sex grounds. Others, however, such as those providing for separate
restroom facilities, sanitary conditions, extra rest periods and maternity
leave,233 do protect women and are beneficial to society. Such laws,
which are considered good, would be abolished along with those considered bad. It has been shown that there is a definite trend toward
holding unreasonable discrimination based on sex void under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and there is no reason to feel that
with the further enlightenment of the courts and the American people
2 33

For an exhaustive listing and discussion of such laws see 116

CONG. REc.

H7955-59 (remarks of Representative McCulloch, citing DEPT.OF LABOR, WoMN's
BuREAu, 1969 HANDBOOK: ON WOMEN WoRRSs,
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that this trend will not be extended on an orderly case-by-case basis.
By this method reasonable discrimination may be saved, whereas unreasonable discrimination will be abolished. American law is based
upon orderly, restrained processes. Therefore, the enactment of an
amendment to the Constitution where it is not drastically needed (because of alternate forces already at work) would seem to be illconsidered.
The unique situation within the domestic area further adds impetus
to the arguments against the new amendment. In virtually every facet
of this area, it is women who derive the main benefits from inequalities within the law. That the laws are unequal in many instances
is obvious-but who is complaining? Certainly many bedraggled males
complain of alimony or support payments and because "she has the
kid and I can't see him except on Sunday." It is submitted that in
the general interest of family welfare this is the way it should normally
be. The reasons are obvious: To insure proper income from a definite
source for children; to insure divorced women who are ill-prepared
to work a proper sustenance; to keep welfare rolls at a minimum;
and to insure children of broken homes that they will have a mother,
when she is morally fit. The effect of the amendment upon such family
and society-oriented laws would be drastic, and it is contended here
that in the best interests of society the amendment is not needed.
In the realm of criminal law the questions as to the practical
effect of the proposed amendment are generally more nebulous and
debatable. It cannot be denied that the amendment would probably
eliminate existing laws which discriminate between men and women
as to length of sentence for commission of the same crime. Here,
however, the trend in the courts is already towards holding such
statutes unconstitutional.
Likewise, in the abortion area, three states in 1970 greatly liberalized
their laws to permit abortions at the discretion of expectant women
and their physicians. Case law is also expanding in this area as
witnessed by the cases discussed previously and others. That the
amendment would even effect the majority of the existing, more
conservative, abortion statutes is highly debatable. Assuming, however, that it would, it seems more prudent to wait and observe the
trends that are being formed before radicalizing our constitutional
law with a new amendment.
Another problem is that the Equal Rights Amendment, if adopted,
would be the first constitutional amendment to grant to the states, as
well as the Congress, authority to implement the amendment by
appropriate legislation. The situation is further complicated by
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Katzenbach v. Morgan,23 4 which states that the Supreme Court will
uphold any congressional statute enacted to vindicate the 14th Amendment rights if it can perceive a basis for such action by Congress. It
is presumed that the Court would likewise have to uphold any state
statute if it can perceive a basis by which such statute vindicates
rights granted by the Equal Rights Amendment. The questions which
would be raised concerning the supremacy clause and our ideas of
federalism are difficult to perceive, let alone answer.
As a final argument it is deemed justifiable to involve a question
of a mere academic or hypothetical nature. It seems reasonable to
declare that the proposed amendment, instead of granting freedom
and equality to one group, would actually replace one restriction on
freedom with another. The legal restriction which might replace state
protective laws, for instance, is meant to enforce equality. But,
necessarily, both the amendment and the protective laws restrict
some individual freedom, and it seems neither can enforce equality.
Whereas past laws kept an employer from hiring a woman he wanted
to hire (e.g., as a bartender), the amendment might allow him to do
so. Likewise, wherever in the past a woman might not have been
able to take a certain job, now an employer might be forced to hire
her. If the old law was bad, why is the new better? In theory both
involve compulsion where freedom should exist.
In a theoretical sense the above is perhaps argumentatively invalid
when considered in light of fairness and public policy. If there has
to be restriction of one group over another, the sentiment of the
nation today would likely be for the woman employee over the
"selfish" employer, much the same as it would be for the hungry black
man over the biased restaurant owner. In practical effect, however,
any change in discriminatory employment laws, whether by the amendment or by orderly case law transition, would probably not be effective. The employer who now hires a female because she is available
at lower pay than a man will not raise her pay; he will abolish her
position, if the chance presents itself, and replace her with a man
once he has to pay her a man's salary. It is very obvious that women
are more likely to be fired and less likely to be hired once equality
in employment is definitely the law.
Those who desire equality for women should adhere to the admonition that: "Only a single-minded fanaticism could fail to see and
to insist upon the fact that men and women are different in many
important respects; that as far as biological science can presently
234

884 U.S. 641 (1966).
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predict they will remain different, and the use of the Constitution as a
means of conjuring away biological inequalities is both an insult to
that document and disregard of fact"; 28 5 or, as Representative
Emmanuel Celler so appropriately declared, "You know, as a matter
of fact, there is only one place where there is equality-and that is
2 6
in the cemetery."
It should not be necessary to reiterate the fact that many of our
existing discriminatory laws cannot be rationally justified in light of
the changes in society which are constantly taking place. But corrective measures must be based upon a realistic view of facts as they
actually exist and not upon a glorious, instant cure-all. A very complicated situation should in no wise be dealt with in terms of a single
abstract panacea.
Mark Stephen Pitt
235 Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 before a Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 82 (1945).
286

116 CONG. REC. H7949 (remarks of Representative Celler).

